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Abstract. In this paper, we present an approach to commonsense causal explanation of stories that
can be used for automatically determining the liable party in legal case descriptions. The approach
is based on LRICore, a core ontology for law that takes a commonsense perspective. Aside from
our thesis that in the legal domain many terms still have a strong commonsense ﬂavour, the
descriptions of events in legal cases, as e.g. presented at judicial trials, are cast in commonsense
terms as well. We present design principles for representing commonsense causation, and describe a
process-based approach to automatic identiﬁcation of causal relations in stories, which are
described in terms of the core ontology. The resulting causal explanation forms a necessary con-
dition for determining the liability and responsibility of agents that play a role in the case. We
describe the basic architecture and working of DIRECT, the demonstrator we are constructing to
test the validity of our process oriented view on commonsense causation. This view holds that
causal relations are in fact abstractions constructed on the basis of our commonsense
understanding of physical and mental processes.
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1. Introduction
Studies in cognitive science, such as in (psycho)linguistics (Clark 1996) or AI
(Hobbs and Moore 1985), show that an enormous amount of commonsense
knowledge is needed to understand everyday situations and events, whether
directly perceived or described in natural language. Moreover, this under-
standing appears eﬀortlessly and is highly accurate, even though scientiﬁc
theories of physical, biological and psychological processes show that the
‘folk’ theories on which we base our day-to-day understanding are false and
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inaccurate under varying circumstances. We can easily predict the outcome
of our own actions, explain the seemingly random occurrence of processes,
and we are even capable of approximating an understanding of what other
people think and believe. And all this, without even the slightest pretension of
knowing exactly what is going on: we just have the general idea.
Our understanding of physical occurrences and agent behaviour requires
not only the identiﬁcation of objects and processes, but also some explana-
tion of why certain events take place. To this end, we continuously construct
models that identify the causal relations between the events that occur
in situations.
In this paper we will describe an approach to capture this commonsense
causation and will describe how it can relevantly contribute to the legal
domain, a domain that is interspersed with commonsense reasoning (Section
2). Section 3 describes how commonsense stories and reports diﬀer from the
more traditional case-oriented approaches. Section 4 describes the generic
framework for legal reasoning that underlies this approach. We will then
describe how case descriptions (stories) can be causally enriched using
DIRECT in Section 5 (see also (Breuker and Hoekstra 2004b; Hoekstra and
Breuker 2005)). Furthermore, we will describe how it diﬀers from existing
work in Section 6.
2. Causation and liability
Causation plays a central role in virtually all scientiﬁc disciplines. In all cases
its use is more precise than in commonsense – for instance, it is distinguished
from covariance and correlation – but essentially it does not diﬀer in its
capacity to explain dependencies between events. However, reﬂection about
its use in science has raised doubts about its status in theories. For instance,
Russell believed that the notion of physical causality obscured rather than
clariﬁed thinking about physics. At the end of this section we will argue
similarly when it comes down to commonsense, and describe how a too
abstract notion of causation muddles discussions on liability theory in law.
2.1. CAUSATION OR CAUSALITY?
The deﬁnition of causality is a major issue in philosophical metaphysics, and
has been for many centuries (Kim 1998; Davidson 2001; Schaﬀer 2003). We
will not enter this debate (again) but refer to the work of Lehmann (2003)
that reviews the main philosophical positions on causation, and is part of the
work we report here. Philosophy primarily concerns itself with what causality
means, i.e. it is focused on ontological questions regarding the existence and
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properties of causality. Epistemological questions arise concerning how we
can know about the occurrence of causality in the real world and, once we do
know, what inferences we can draw from the causal relation between two
events.
Lehmann (2003) adopts a distinction between the notions of causality and
causation; he uses the term ‘causality’ to denote the ontological view, and
reserves the term ‘causation’ for the occurrence of causality. At ﬁrst sight, this
may seem paradoxical as we usually assume the occurrence of a concept to be
its instance. However, causal dependencies between events are not based on
the recognition of an instance of causation. Causation is rather an abstract,
reﬂective concept that summarises a more qualitatively distinct relation. In
other words, after we perceive a collision between two billiard balls, we infer
a transfer of power from the moving ball to the static ball. This allows us to
say that the collision caused the second ball to move. In a nutshell, the basis
for the approach presented here is that recognising the transfer of power at
the collision is suﬃcient for our understanding; the assertion that the colli-
sion caused the ball to move is superﬂuous.
For this reason, the question whether causality is a real thing in the world,
as is the major theme in philosophy, is of less importance to us. We rather
give an account of causation, i.e. how we may understand relationships
between events in terms of processes – e.g. transfer of energy or power. The
intermediary role of processes can be conceived as a dependency: as causa-
tion between events. In this view, causation is no more and no less than the
(abductive) inference that the occurrence of event B can be explained by a
(sub-)process that is implied by an earlier or simultaneous event A. In
summary, our focus on causation rather than causality allows us to respect-
fully avoid the unsettled philosophical debate on causality.
2.2. LIABILITY
The attribution of responsibility is one of the most prominent tasks in legal
reasoning. And although highly specialised, commonsense reasoning plays an
important role in establishing the liable party in court. Hart and Honore´
(1985) deﬁne legal responsibility as the ‘‘liability of a person to be punished,
forced to compensate, or otherwise subjected to a sanction by the law’’. In
other words, if a judge or other authorised party acknowledges someone’s
liability to be punished, the person is considered to be held legally respon-
sible. Interpreting and explaining written accounts of events (e.g. oﬃcial
reports) is certainly one of the primary tasks of the court. The causal relation
between events is not just an incidental aspect of legal reasoning, but can be
considered the second most important after the application of norms; at least
for determining liability, see Valente (1995). As described in Lehmann (2003),
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(legal) causality, responsibility, liability and guilt are closely intertwined
concepts in legal reasoning aimed at compensating for wrong doing. The
work described here is based on Lehmann (2003), but deviates from his more
recent work of Lehmann et al. (2004) and Lehmann and Gangemi (2006) in
that it has a stronger AI ﬂavour.
Lehmann did a thorough investigation of the main aspects of legal cau-
sation in Artiﬁcial Intelligence, and proposed a high-level ontology for
representing causation in law, cf. Lehmann (2003). Following Hart and
Honore´ (1985), he identiﬁes the following grounds for the attribution of legal
responsibility to a person for a given harm:
1. the conduct of a person,
2. the causal connection between the conduct of the person and the given
harm,
3. the fault legally implied by the conduct of the person.
These grounds can be combined to form the following 7 categories: (1)
conduct, causation, and fault; (2) conduct and causation (strict liability);
(3) conduct occasioning harm and fault; (4) conduct occasioning harm; (5)
conduct and fault (common in criminal law); (6) conduct; (7) purely legal
ground (insurance or guarantee). Occasioning is a weak counterfactual
causal connection: it can be tested by the sine qua non rule.
The discourse on liability and legal causation in legal theory suﬀers from
causal overloading. This overloading takes place on three levels: terms,
conclusions and policy. First, terms such as conduct, fault and harm can only
used as labels for actual events after careful consideration and (non-legal)
causal reasoning. Restricting a theory on liability attribution to the (causal)
relation between those terms is therefore biased with respect to some
particular interpretation of events, and does no real justice to the complexity
of the legal and causal reasoning underlying that interpretation. Second, the
7th category of Hart & Honore´, i.e. a purely legal ground, is a good example
of where complex causal and legal reasoning is obfuscated by its conclusion,
i.e. which party is deemed liable. Although it is certainly true that parents are
liable for damage caused by their children (and as such are not liable on the
bases of conduct, causal connection or fault by themselves), there still needs
to be ‘conduct’ or ‘fault’ (e.g. breaking someone’s window) by some other
person (the child). This secondary chain of reasoning is perhaps not legally
relevant, but is certainly necessary for establishing the liability relation
between the broken window and the liable party. As a rule, legal causation is
thus always established after the fact, i.e. after the reasoning process is
completed. Third, ‘causal’ relations between conduct and harm are not
always necessarily causal as far as commonsense is concerned, but can be
based on policy or legal tradition. For instance, in Dutch law a fault may be
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almost retroactively deemed to have legally caused some harm, based on
criteria such as the vulnerability of the victim.
An example of the overloaded causal relation is negative causation, or
negligence. Negative causation concerns the case where some event would
not have occurred if an agent hat acted appropriately. Negative causation
occurs in the case where an actor should have performed some action, but
didn’t. It is therefore a normative statement, comparing perceived behaviour
to some idealised standard behaviour.
Liability is not only determined on the basis of successful actions, attempts
to act can be a ground as well. For instance, negative causation often does
not hold when an agent unsuccessfully attempted to prevent the harm.
Attempts to act do not result in the desired action, but rather some rough
approximation of it. For these reasons, the distinction between commonsense
causation and legal causation needs to be scrupulously guarded. The latter
has an overlap with the concept of liability, where the former has not.
In the same way, physical causation and causation in fact (or factual
causation) are separate concepts: causation in fact represents the non-legal
part of (established) legal causation and covers both physical and agent
causation. The construction of a (partial) commonsense causal chain is
always necessary for determining liability, even for cases where the liability is
not based on some form of legal causation. Thus, in order to reach the higher
goal of automatic liability attribution, we need to have an explicit repre-
sentation of both commonsense causation, and of commonsense legal
causation.
3. Cases as stories
Traditional approaches to reasoning on legal cases in AI&Law (e.g. Ashley
1990, 1997)) generally concern themselves with a comparison of cases as
described in the verdict of a judge. Such case descriptions contain only those
elements which were deemed relevant by the judge to support the verdict:
they are compiled facts used as arguments. As argued in the previous section,
we believe that for the causal explanation needed in liability attribution, at
least all information available to a judge should enter under consideration.
This information typically takes the form of (oﬃcial) reports by police oﬃ-
cers, eyewitness reports, written statements etc., in short: stories told by
people.
These stories generally relate of eﬀects in the physical world caused by
agents, and are interspersed with views on the motives and intentions behind
actions. In a more extreme form, communication actions do not have any
signiﬁcant physical inﬂuence; they rather inﬂuence the mental state of other
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agents, i.e. they are purely interpersonal. Communication transfers intentions
(motives, plans) and beliefs to other people; it is the most direct manifestation
of what is often called interpersonal causation (Hart and Honore´ 1985;
Lehmann 2003): some agent can provide reasons or draw attention to reasons
which inﬂuence the conduct of another agent, who causes some event.
Interpersonal causation is thus tightly connected to the notions of coercion
and authority.
As long as the views expressed in stories are in accord with commonsense,
they appear to be acceptable to a reader. Obviously, ambiguities about the
causes of actions are well known in legal cases. Nonetheless, actions can only
be described in relation to their physical eﬀect: every action minimally in-
volves some movement of the body. Similarly, interpersonal processes are
dependent of physical conduits (be it air or phone wires) and are thus subject
to the same spatial and temporal bounds. Diﬀerent perceptions of the same
events often correspond on what happened ‘physically’, but diverge on the
underlying intentions and motives (as e.g. in a quarrel).
The events and situations we experience are ﬁltered by perceptual mech-
anisms; i.e. selective, attentional mechanisms, and in particular the applica-
tion of perceptual and conceptual categories. Verbal reports of these
experiences often leave out explicit accounts of perceived causation, because
commonsense allows us to reconstruct this relation almost eﬀortlessly. These
stories, thus, usually do not contain ‘self evident’ causal relationships, i.e.
similar to the original observation of actual events, causation needs to be
inferred.
Philosophy maintains two conﬂicting views on physical causation. The
ﬁrst being Russell’s original view that causation is a secondary, and largely
redundant concept (see Section 2.1). Second, philosophy often sees causation
as a primary concept, right next to space, time etc. which can be experienced
a priori. For our commonsense approach, we understand causation to be
secondary, and causal relations are attributed to events we can ‘explain’ by
referring to some known process. We do not ‘know’ theoretical causal
dependencies, but rather recognise operationalised processes.
Commonsense has a huge number of physical processes in stock,
which – despite the fact that humans may easily agree and have consistent
interpretations – we will not be able to represent (the famous knowledge-
acquisition bottleneck). However, our research is in essence not intended
to enable machines to actually read reports in legal case documentation,
and to identify (legal) responsibility and liability, but rather to render
theoretical views on causation and liability in computational terms for the
purpose of verifying their consistency and demonstrating their conse-
quences.
In the following sections we will not not deal with the question of suﬃ-
ciency of evidence for establishing legal causation and liability, we will focus
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instead on laying the groundwork for a system that will enable us to deter-
mine liability. Input to this system are the commonsense stories we have
described in this section. These stories are incomplete accounts of some chain
of events, resulting in an undesirable situation. Explaining these stories in
terms of physical causation is then the ﬁrst step in the automatic detection of
liability and causal relations (i.e. by DIRECT).
4. A generic framework for legal reasoning
The causal explanation of stories is embedded in a generic framework for legal
reasoning. As any knowledge-based application, it is deﬁned by both an
epistemological and an ontological view of the task domain. The former could
be seen as the interpretation of the concepts in a domain for a particular
purpose. The latter deﬁnes those knowledge-structures the system is to reason
about. In our case, the epistemological framework is the Functional Ontology
of Law, described in (Valente 1995). Though called ‘ontology’, FOLaw does
not contain traditional ontological categories (Breuker and Hoekstra 2004c).
These are provided by the LRICore ontology for law: an ontology founded on
commonsense principles, see Breuker andHoekstra (2004a) and Breuker et al.
(2004). This section sketches these two components that make up our generic
framework for legal reasoning.
4.1. THE FUNCTIONAL ONTOLOGY OF LAW
A general breakdown of the types of knowledge and their dependencies,
involved in the legal domain is described in (Valente 1995). His Functional
Ontology of Law is an epistemological framework that describes the legal
system as an instrument to inﬂuence the behaviour of (part(s) of) society, in
order to reach certain social goals, i.e. it exists to fulﬁl a certain function. In
this sense, the legal system can be viewed as a ‘‘social device which reacts to
social behaviour, operating in- and on society’’.
Essentially, the FOLaw describes the path along which a formal account
travels as it is under consideration of the legal system. First, the account is
described using commonsense terms. As it ‘enters’ the legal system, it is
enriched with legal vocabulary, i.e. it is interpreted, or legally explained. The
causal relations between events described in the account are identiﬁed. This
interpreted causal account is then considered for norm violations, using some
body of normative knowledge (rules, legislation, precedents), and liability is
determined for agents (in)directly responsible for the violation or some harm.
A reactive measure is then taken on the basis of the outcome of this process.
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The separation of the detection and establishing of a causal account and
the attribution of responsibility is considered rather controversial in the ﬁeld
of AI and Law. In Section 2 we have described why we think this distinction
still is very useful for building ontology based legal reasoning systems, and in
Section 5 we will discuss a more detailed procedure for causal explanation
within this framework.
4.2. THE LRICORE ONTOLOGY
Legal accounts are always based on some abstraction of real-world occur-
rences, uninterpreted accounts are expressed in the commonsense vocabulary
people use in everyday communication. Legal norms, and deﬁnitions of legal
concepts we commonly ﬁnd in legislation are expressed using a mixture of
these commonsense terms and (domain) speciﬁc legal jargon; a heterogeneous
abstraction of commonsense descriptions. For this reason, it is our convic-
tion that legal knowledge representation should be strongly based on those
concepts which are part of both the legal professionals’ and the citizens’
understanding of the legal ﬁeld. Not only does this facilitate mapping
between an ontology and legal texts, it enables the direct communication on
internal reasoning processes of a legal knowledge-based system to its users.
Reasoning on oﬃcial reports and accounts therefore requires some com-
mon unifying vocabulary: a core ontology of law. Generally speaking, a core
ontology covers the common vocabulary of a ﬁeld, e.g. medicine, law, physics
and so on (Valente and Breuker 1996; van Heijst et al. 1997). These ﬁelds in
turn, usually consist of multiple domains such as criminal law, environmental
law and private law. A core ontology speciﬁes the common conceptual
denominators of a ﬁeld, i.e. those abstract concepts that are part of all (or an
important majority of) domains. In law concepts like norm, role, document,
liability, etc. are present in all legal domains, both implicitly and explicitly.
Except for CYC, existing foundational ontologies (e.g. SUMO, Sowa’s
upper ontology (Sowa 2000) and DOLCE (Gangemi et al. 2002)) do not
generally take an explicit commonsense stance. Even in DOLCE, which is
based upon human perception, cultural imprints and social conventions, the
commonsense perspective is not explicitly developed. Although it does model
the world of commonsense, it does not model using the vocabulary and
structure of commonsense: it is rather a framework for describing
commonsense things, than a commonsense framework. An example of this is
its use of meta-properties such as the distinction between endurants and
perdurants.
LRICore is represented in OWL DL using the Prote´ge´ ontology editor and
its OWL Plugin, Figure 1 shows the main categories. More on LRICore is
available at http://wiki.leibnizcenter.org/open/index.php/LRI_Core.
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5. Commonsense causation in DIRECT
The notions of causation and responsibility described in the previous section,
are operationalised in a system called DIRECT (see Figure 2). The input for
DIRECT is a simple story, typical for legal case descriptions, which consists
of unrelated events. It is DIRECT’s task to identify causal and intentional
relations between these events. DIRECT is powered by (extensions of)
LRICore, i.e. LRICore is the knowledgebase we use for interpreting story
fragments.
The machine-interpretable representation of a story is an explicit account
of what occurred during a certain period of time, i.e. it is expressed in terms
of instances (i.e. states) of individuals, and the events that change these
individuals. Figure 3 illustrates the relation between story and ontology. We
deﬁne a Story to be a temporally ordered collection of situations. It can be
conceived of as a ﬁlmstrip or storyboard like sequence of situation models. A
Situation is a state of aﬀairs: a ﬁxed (spatial) conﬁguration in a collection of
states of individuals, during some bounded period of time. Part of these
situations, a State is the instance (occurrence) of an individual at a certain
time and place. In other words, an individual is the identity holder for a set of
Figure 1. Top two layers of LRICore.
Figure 2. General architecture of DIRECT.
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states. Since the ontology deﬁnes concepts such as e.g. Person, Ball ,Window,
we are capable of recognising the states in our story as instances of these
concepts. An Event is then the occurrence of a transition between two situ-
ations: at least one individual changes state, and consequently the event
brings about a new situation.
To construct a causal explanation within this framework, DIRECT
interprets these single facts (events and states) in a story by ﬁnding the
underlying processes which may account for the changes that occur between
the situations it describes. The core ontology represents our knowledge of the
world; the mapping between instances in a story and terms of the ontology is
an interpretation of those instances.
We hold the hypothesis that an account of events and states in terms of
processes is both necessary and suﬃcient for the identiﬁcation of causal
relationships. As explained in Section 3 an operational representation in
terms of processes to explain events in stories is much closer to the everyday
conception of occurrences than abstract causal dependencies (see also Section
6). In everyday communication we explain events in terms of processes:
‘‘Tom kicked the ball, and the window broke’’ we automatically interpret as
‘‘The window broke because Tom kicked the ball’’. The order of statements
in a sentence is interpreted as an ordering in time. The story in Figure 3 is a
conjunction of situations; what DIRECT does is provide a translation from
and to because in terms of processes.
Commonsense causation is deﬁned as the relation that holds between two
events iﬀ there exists some intermediary process(es) that binds the consequent
Figure 3. Instances in a story interpreted in terms of an ontology.
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state of the ﬁrst event to the antecedent of the second. In general, two types
of causation are minimally necessary for establishing legal causation in fact:
physical causation which describes physical processes and agent causation
which describes the actions of rational agents. As described in Sections 2 and
3, legal theory, e.g. (Lehmann 2003; Hart and Honore´ 1985), introduces two
additional forms of causation: interpersonal causation, which describes the
eﬀect one agent might have on another (e.g. as a consequence of communi-
cation), and negative causation, representing the connection between an eﬀect
and some agent not acting (e.g. negligence). As the latter are combinations of
the former, we will focus our discussion on the detection of physical causa-
tion and our ideas about agent causation.
5.1. PROCESSES AND ACTIONS
Events and states occur at some time and place, i.e. they happen against a
four-dimensional canvas of space and time. These coordinates provide us
with clues for the discovery of causal relationships: location limits causal
propagation. We distinguish between mental events and physical events, the
former constitutes a change in the mental state of a person, and the latter is a
change in the physical world. Physical causation occurs when some physical
event causes another physical event: i.e. one or more some physical processes
can be recognised, which accounts for the events. Physical processes consist
of other physical processes or of transitions which are deﬁned by pre- and
post-conditions on physical entities, e.g. Standstill toMoving (see
Figure 4) is a physical transition since the restrictions on the from and to
properties include membership of the PhysicalObject class.
Commonsense covers a wide variety of diﬀering notions of process: from
mechanics (movement), radiation of light, heat exchange, etc. to some
primitive chemistry and biology (e.g. digestion). Some events are inherently
hidden, they do inhibit change, but do not create diﬀerences which can be
easily detected. The chemical equilibrium, for instance, is important in
explaining certain occurrences but does not in itself constitute any discrete
change in the state of an object. This is a matter of granularity. By increasing
the detail of the description of such processes, the diﬀerent components (i.e.
transitions) of the process can be separated.
Agent causation, or mental causation, is deﬁned as the causal relation
between a mental event and a physical event. The recognition of agent
causation is an important prerequisite for detecting liability as conduct is
either some action, or a prolonged state caused by an action (e.g. the
possession of illegal ﬁrearms). To detect this kind of causation we need to
recognise the physical events which are brought about by the actions of
intentional agents.
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An Action is a special type of physical process which consist of both
transitions which operate on only mental objects and of transitions on
physical objects: the decision to act, and the act itself. Transitions with
conditions that cross the gap between the physical and the mental do not
exist as this would imply that an object can be both mental and physical at
the same time. Physical actions are operations by agents on the physical
world, i.e. they are changes caused by (intentional) muscle movement.
Because of these physical characteristics of actions it is suﬃcient to know a
process to be an action if it was initiated by an agent. Furthermore, eﬀects of
actions are local to agents, and do not have a physical predecessor.
Actions diﬀer from physical processes in that these operations are guided
by some instigating motive. The action needs to be accompanied by some
intention, the will to achieve some goal, the agent’s reason for acting. This
intention should not be confused with legal intent, as the latter is rather a
plan-like structure with goals that lie beyond those of a single action.
Without intention an act would be ‘just’ a process. Although knowledge of
intention is certainly necessary to be able to distinguish between legally
relevant types e.g. voluntary and involuntary actions, negligence, coercion
etc. it is of no particular relevance to the detection of the causal chain
between the (physical) event brought about by the action and its physical
eﬀect. This detection of physical causal relations is the basis for more com-
plex causal discovery, and (in the end) a prerequisite for the attribution of
liability.
A Transition describes an allowed (possible, meaningful) change in the
value of a single property deﬁned on some individual. The restriction on the
pre or post condition of a transition can be any complex OWL class deﬁ-
nition. An example of a simple transition can be seen in Figure 4.
We deﬁne Process in a similar fashion; it is a functionally coherent
aggregate of one or more transitions and sub-processes. When executed, it
consumes or produces resources (e.g. energy, time) and changes individuals,
i.e. it produces new states. Processes manifest themselves in stories as the
occurrence of one or more events, transitions can only occur as a single event.
Figure 5 illustrates how events and states in a story are mapped onto tran-
sitions and processes.
Although a standard OWL description classiﬁer is able to infer the type
(i.e. transition) of events between simple states, and can infer whether
conjunctions of identiﬁed transitions belong to a particular process, more
complex (structural or spatial) constraints cannot be expressed in OWL. For
Figure 4. The deﬁnition of the Standstill-to-Moving transition.
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example, we could express that transition Standstill toMoving can
change a property (e.g. acceleration) of some physical object on the condition
that it is connected to some other object, and remains connected to some
object. But we cannot express that these objects should be the same. Even
worse, OWL does not even allow us to express that the precondition holds
for the same object as the post-condition. For this reason, SWRL rules are
speciﬁed that constrain the identities of the OWL individuals involved in the
execution of processes and transitions.
We currently employ a simple iterative deepening generate-and-test
strategy to causal discovery. For sure this process can be optimised using
more advanced heuristics, which we are currently investigating. DIRECT will
allow for generating and testing hypothetical causal explanations using dif-
ferent techniques, and evaluating those techniques. Hypothetical explana-
tions (i.e. chains of instantiated transitions and/or processes) are generated
and checked for validity with respect to the ontology using a freely available
description classiﬁer (currently Pellet) and SWRL/Jena rules.
The causal analysis of a story of unconnected events, results in an explicit
account of what happened, telling us which events were causally related and
why. We can then use this model to determine whether this enrichment of a
case with commonsense causal explanations is suﬃcient for liability
Figure 5. Matching states and events to predeﬁned transitions and processes.
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attribution. In the following section we will discuss how the emphasis on
process oriented representation of commonsense causation diﬀers from other
approaches AI.
6. Existing approaches
In Artiﬁcial Intelligence, causation has been the direct or indirect object of
study in a number of specialised areas. Worth mentioning in this respect is the
work of (Pearl 2000), which ﬁnds its basis in a probabilistic representation of
physical causation, more knowledge-intensive approaches to physical causa-
tion from the ﬁelds of Qualitative Reasoning (QR) and Model Based
Reasoning (MBR) (e.g. Horn 1990), ontology-based approaches, and a
multitude of formalisms for agent causation (communication) within
multi-agent systems.
6.1. FORMAL CAUSAL REASONING
The work by Pearl (2000) stands out in AI as the most comprehensive and
explicit modelling of what we may call ‘‘computational causality’’. The major
substance of his work is in probabilistic (Bayesian) modelling of quantiﬁable
dependencies between occurrences, e.g. the use of drugs and their eﬀects on
patients. In this sense it ﬁts the tradition in science to enable the identiﬁcation
of causes or causal factors in a well founded, formal way. This work is also
relevant for legal reasoning about cases that have a probabilistic basis (data
about (co-)occurrences), as for instance in claims about compensation for
damage of health suﬀered due to the consumption of certain industrial
products. However, his approach is not particularly well suited for the kind
of causation that we have in mind and which (Pearl 2000, Ch. 10) coined
‘‘actual cause’’: i.e. ‘‘an event recognised as responsible for the production of
a certain outcome ... Human intuition is extremely keen in detecting and
ascertaining this type of causation and hence is considered the key to con-
struct explanations ... and the ultimate criterion (known as ‘‘cause in fact’’)
for determining legal responsibility’’ (p. 309). Although his view on the
conceptual basis for (actual) causation is similar to ours: ‘‘Clearly, actual
causation requires information beyond that of necessity and suﬃciency: the
actual process mediating between the cause and the eﬀect must enter into
consideration. (p. 309)’’, it diﬀers in that for us this consideration is not a
mere additional element but primary and suﬃcient for deciding on causation
in fact. His somewhat exploratory work on factual causation is again aimed
at a formal, ‘correct’ modelling of causal dependency rather than the
commonsense perspective that we want to represent and formalise.
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6.2. QUALITATIVE AND MODEL BASED REASONING (QR AND MBR)
Another potential source of inspiration for our work can be found in the
representation and reasoning involved in modelling the structure and
behaviour of systems (see for a current overview Bredeweg and Struss
(2004)). QR started as an approach to commonsense reasoning and was for a
while coined as ‘‘naive physics’’ (Hayes 1985) in his inﬂuential ‘‘second naive
physics manifesto’’ argues that causality is not a ‘‘useful, self-contained
theory’’, but ‘‘that it is an umbrella term for a large variety of particular
relationships’’ (p. 19). We agree that causality (or causation) is not a primary
term in an ontology of common sense (e.g. it is not part of LRICore) and see
the variety of relationships as the variety of kinds of processes we know of.
In QR, a model of the structure of a system – e.g. an electronic circuitry –
is used to simulate the propagation of behavioural changes through the
system (including structural changes of the system itself). This propagation
yields behavioural traces of chains of events, which represent the predictions
about the behaviour of the system, given some initial state. Events in QR are
connected by two kinds of relations: inﬂuences and proportionalities.
Proportionalities represent deﬁnitional or inherent dependencies. For
instance, an increase in volume of a substance corresponds linearly with the
weight of a substance. Inﬂuences are actual causes. Processes are viewed as
the origin of causation (Forbus 1984). The ‘scientiﬁcally’ correct distinction
between dependencies does not completely match commonsense intuitions.
Students have great diﬃculty in applying this distinction and in everyday
reasoning it hardly appears to matter.
QR is particularly useful for modelling well known and stable physical
structures, i.e. devices, and it is here that model based reasoning – an applied
oﬀshoot of QR – ﬁnds its applications. Although QR has been used in other
domains than physics, e.g. in modelling ecological and social systems, its
views are limited to purely physical causation, i.e. causation as implied by
physical processes. It does not provide a means to model agents, let alone the
processes initiated by them.
6.3. AGENT TECHNOLOGY
Agent causation is not entirely explained by causes but by reasons, and in
particular the intention to perform an action. The notion of intention,
although more recent, has given rise to as much philosophical controversy as
causation. In AI the notion has been operationalised to model actions, and in
particular communication between artiﬁcial agents. The languages by which
these agents communicate typically provide constructs for representing
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belief-states, actions, plans, data etc. The most prominent example being the
belief, desire, intention (BDI) model, cf. Georgeﬀ et al. (1999). The BDI
model is a representation of the inner workings of agents (including people),
and can contribute to a better understanding of how intention inﬂuences
action. Nonetheless, there are a number of reasons why agent technology
cannot be used (initially) for detecting commonsense causation. First of all,
agent technology is concerned with simulation, real-time behaviour of agents,
where liability attribution requires postdiction. Where artiﬁcial agents do
planning, we need to do plan recognition. Furthermore, agent technology
does not adhere to a particular theory on physical causation. As we have
argued in the previous section, the bulk of actions undertaken by people
directly correspond to an intention and can therefore be primarily explained
using physical constructs.
6.4. ONTOLOGY
The ontological approach to causation in fact described in Lehmann et al.
(2004) and Lehmann and Gangemi (2006), deﬁnes causal dependencies within
the framework of the DOLCE ontology, see e.g. Gangemi et al.
(2002).Causal relations relate very simple (types of) events that change a
single aspect of a single object. Between these (sets of) simple events, three
existential dependencies are identiﬁed: structural, causality and circumstantial
dependencies. Physical causation is deﬁned as the relation that holds between
two individual events that satisfy both the causality and the circumstantial
constraints. The framework allows for the classiﬁcation of some description
of a number of events as an instance of physical causation in fact.
The ontology contains no theory of the (physical) world; i.e. descriptions
are not expressed using domain knowledge. For instance, the semantics of a
state is not represented intensionally, but only through its name (e.g. being-
wounded), it contains no description of what it means to be in that state.
The lack of such descriptions makes this approach less useful for
explaining the existence of a causal relation. We argue that by deﬁning
causation solely at the abstract level of dependencies, important information
which can explain causal relations in stories and descriptions is lost.
Furthermore a system built on such a representation is less ﬂexible with
respect to practical use in which accounts are generally under-speciﬁed.
7. Discussion and future work
We presented a process based approach for ontology-based discovery of
causal relations in stories, and shown how it can form the groundwork for
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the automatic determination of liability. We have argued that existing
approaches from philosophy and AI do not represent actual causation in a
way which is in accordance with commonsense, whereas the stories that lie at
the heart of legal cases are entirely of a commonsense nature. Furthermore,
we have discussed the importance of commonsense causal reasoning for
establishing legal causation and determining the liable party on the basis of
oﬃcial reports. Legal theoretical discussions on the role of causation in
liability attribution obfuscate the diﬀerence between these two notions. This
impedes a proper understanding of what knowledge needs to be added to
stories to make attribution possible.
The commonsense stance of LRICore distinguishes it from other estab-
lished foundational ontologies such as DOLCE and SUMO. Based on
psychological evidence, it is closer to our everyday interpretation of reality
than other more science, or philosophy-based approaches. It is our convic-
tion that legal knowledge representation requires such psychologically
plausible commonsense conceptualisation of the world. Together with
FOLaw, it provides a generic framework for legal reasoning which has a
strong epistemological, ontological and legal theoretical grounding.
We adopt a deﬁnition of causation which is very close to the common-
sense interpretation of cause and eﬀect. It is based on a non-probabilistic
ontological conceptual representation of agent- and physical causation
expressed using commonly understood processes. This representation is used
by DIRECT to construct causal explanations from partial accounts – such as
stories – of temporally ordered series of events, using predeﬁned processes.
We are currently experimenting with stories that contain simple physical
causal relations and agents without elaborate intentions. As we have
discussed in Sections 5.1 and 6, we believe these relations are often suﬃcient
for basic connections between action and eﬀect. In law, an example are
relatively simple torts, such as causing damage, where intention is used to
determine the degree of liability (see also Section 2.2), and the act itself is
enough to commit the tort.
We will gradually extend DIRECT to be able to handle a set of more
complex stories which include more elaborate notions such as intentions,
plans, coercion, persuasion and other legally relevant elements. This will
involve the addition of more legal and domain-dependent concept deﬁni-
tions, such as processes, actions and objects to LRICore.
For sure the work presented here only scratches the surface of the com-
plexity involved in not only legal reasoning but also commonsense physical
reasoning. However, it forms the premise for more elaborate commonsense
legal reasoning, and enables us to formulate and test our hypothesis that a
process-based causal explanation of events and states is both necessary and
suﬃcient for liability attribution.
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Notes
1 DIRECT:DIscovery of REsponsibility and CausaliTy.
2 Later he admitted that this was maybe too strong an opinion.
3 Although (Lehmann et al. 2005) lists only 5 combinations, we rather adhere to the full
list of Hart and Honore´ (1985).
4 More speciﬁcally, in law anything causal is in the end caused by people: legal causation
always originates from some conduct.
5 See http://www.cyc.com
6 Suggested Upper Merged Ontology; http://ontology.teknowledge.com
7 Descriptive Ontology for Linguistic and Cognitive Engineering; http://www.loa-cnr.it/
DOLCE.html
8 See http://protege.stanford.edu
9 The notion of ‘individual’ in OWL is rather confusing. Because of open-world semantics,
an OWL individual is not an identity holder (it is rather an instance). In the following, we
will use the word individual in its more traditional meaning.
10 The term mental causation is rather confusing; we have argued in amongst others
(Breuker and Hoekstra 2004a) that thinking is purely intentional and therefore does not
follow the laws of cause and eﬀect.
11 The example uses Manchester OWL Syntax, see: http://www.co-ode.org/resources/
reference/manchester_syntax/
12 See http://www.mindswap.org/2003/pellet.
13 See http://jena.sourceforge.net and http://www.w3.org/Submission/SWRL/
14 If the substance is not a contained gas.
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